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STATUTORY WILLS: 
A CASE FOR GRANTING ONTARIO COURTS THE AUTHORITY TO PASS 
STATUTORY WILLS ON BEHALF OF PERSONS LACKING 
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 
 
Hassan Chaudhary 
 
 
In Ontario, individuals have the freedom to create their own will. However, 
a person lacking testamentary capacity cannot draft an enforceable will. For 
those individuals who lack testamentary capacity and thereby draft an 
unenforceable will or simply pass away intestate, their estate is distributed 
according to the laws of intestacy, which can result in an undesirable 
outcome. An unjust distribution of an individual’s estate can, nevertheless, be 
avoided by providing Ontario courts with the ability to make, change, or 
revoke a will. 
 
 
 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Testamentary freedom is an idea that is highly valued and 
strongly embraced in Ontario. It provides testators, also known as 
will-makers, with the freedom to create their own will. As a result, a 
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testator can determine how his or her estate will be divided, subject to 
practical legal limitations.1 For a will-maker to exercise this ability, 
however, he or she must possess testamentary capacity. An important 
criterion for determining testamentary capacity was developed by the 
English courts in Banks v Goodfellow.2 It requires a will-maker to 
have an understanding of the nature of his or her will, recognition of 
his or her own assets, and an awareness of who may reasonably 
become a beneficiary of the estate. While medical professionals may 
be called upon to help make these determinations, the fundamental 
question is of a legal nature. If a court holds that a testator did not 
possess testamentary capacity at the time the will was drafted, it shall 
be invalidated. Thus, a person lacking testamentary capacity cannot 
draft an enforceable will. 
Some adults may lose testamentary capacity due to severe 
illness or injury while others may never possess testamentary capacity 
during their lifetime as a result of developmental delays. The relevant 
legal question that arises in these scenarios is whether Ontario courts 
should be given the power to create statutory wills for these 
individuals. By conferring such authority, Ontario’s judiciary would 
be able to make, change or revoke the will of an individual who does 
not meet the requisite mental threshold. This paper will argue that 
Ontario courts should be given such authority. In developing this 
argument, the relevant Ontario law will be examined, followed by the 
history of the concept and a comparative analysis of how 
Commonwealth jurisdictions have addressed statutory wills. After 
exploring arguments in favour of and against such a scheme, this 
paper will put forward a proposal outlining specific recommendations 
for legislative reform authorizing Ontario courts to pass statutory 
wills. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S 26, ss 57-60 [SLRA]; Family Law Act 
RSO 1990 ss 29-39 [FLA]. 
2 Banks v Goodfellow (1870), LR 5 QB 549 (Eng QB). 
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II 
CURRENT LAW IN ONTARIO 
 
In Ontario, the Substitute Decisions Act provides guidance 
and relief for individuals that are not mentally capable of making 
decisions regarding their property or personal care. The Act allows for 
the appointment of a substitute decision-maker to act on behalf of the 
person lacking testamentary capacity. 
If an individual is unable to make property-related decisions, a 
substitute decision-maker may be appointed in one of three ways. 
First, the original decision-maker may appoint a continuing power of 
attorney via a written document3 provided that this is done before the 
original decision-maker loses capacity.4 Second, a statutory guardian 
may be appointed.5 This typically occurs when the original decision-
maker has not chosen a continuing power of attorney, is placed in a 
psychiatric facility, and is determined to be incapable of managing his 
or her property.6 In these situations, the statutory guardian of any 
property will be the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT).7 A family 
member or another person may apply to the PGT to assume the role.8 
Finally, a court-ordered guardian can be appointed.9 In order to be 
selected as a guardian, an individual would have to apply to a court. 
Prior to approving an application, the court would have to be certain 
that the original decision-maker is incapable of making property-
related decisions.10 
The appointed attorney or guardian is provided with a broad 
set of powers. Typically, he or she is authorized to do anything the 
original decision-maker could have with respect to the estate’s 
finances.11 However, attorneys and guardians are expressly forbidden 
from making, changing or revoking the incapacitated person’s will for 
                                                            
3 Substitutes Decisions Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 30, s 7 [SDA]. 
4 SDA, ibid, s 8. 
5 SDA, ibid, s 15. 
6 SDA, ibid, s 15-16.  
7 SDA, ibid. 
8 SDA, ibid. 
9 SDA, ibid, s 22-25 
10 SDA, ibid. 
11 SDA, ibid, ss 7(2), s 31(1). 
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two reasons.12 First, individuals are restricted from performing acts 
that another is legally required to perform.13 The crafting of wills – 
similar to marriage or serving a prison term –is placed in this category 
due to its intimate nature and the need for a subjective assessment 
that could not be duplicated by another. Second, the appointed 
attorney or guardian is legally obligated to act in the best interest of 
the incapacitated person, and thus allowing he or she to alter the will 
could cause a conflict of interest.14 
Like substitute decision-makers, Ontario courts under the 
current legislative scheme have limited authority to alter wills. 
Indeed, assuming dependents – if any – have been adequately 
provided for and there are no apparent public policy concerns, the 
courts cannot make, change or revoke a will on behalf of a person 
lacking testamentary capacity.15 However, the reasons as to why a 
substitute decision-maker may not alter a will do not apply to the 
judiciary and are thereby immaterial. In establishing this claim, 
context is useful and instructive. Thus, a historical perspective will be 
provided followed by an examination of jurisdictions that allow for 
statutory wills. 
 
III 
CONCEPTUAL ORIGINS OF STATUTORY WILLS 
 
Making legal decisions on behalf of an incapacitated 
individual regarding the division of their estate has its origins in the 
laws of lunacy.16 Statutory wills emerged when English courts began 
focusing on how a lunatic’s surplus income could best be distributed.17 
                                                            
12 SDA, ibid.  
13 Dawn D Oosterhoff, “Alice’s Wonderland: Authority of an Attorney for Property to 
Amend a Beneficiary Designation” (2002) 22 ETPJ 16 at 18-19.  
14 Ibid. 
15 SLRA & FLA, supra note 1. Certain public policy concerns where the court would 
set a will aside include findings that (i) the testator was unduly influenced (i.e. 
coerced), (ii) the will failed to comply with the requirements of due execution, (iii) 
the testator lacked knowledge of the contents of the will and did not approve its 
content, and (iv) evidence of fraud or forgery. 
16 Rosalind F Croucher, “An Interventionist, Paternalistic Jurisdiction: The Place of 
Statutory Wills in Australian Succession Law” (2009) 32 UNSWLJ 674 at 675-76.  
17 Ibid. 
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In the landmark decision of Re Hinde (1816), Lord Eldon of the Court 
of Chancery claimed that the court’s “principal duty was to the 
lunatic” and established a framework to govern the division of a 
lunatic’s estate.18 After all of a lunatic’s debts and expenses were paid, 
others – presumably the lunatic’s kin – would be considered in the 
distribution of the estate,19 because the distribution was to be done in 
the manner “the lunatic himself would do, if he were in a capacity to 
act.”20 This approach, whereby the court would attempt to divide the 
estate in the presumed wishes of the lunatic, became known as the 
“substituted-judgment approach” and has been most influential in 
modern English law.21 
 
IV 
STATUTORY WILLS IN OTHER COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS 
 
A. ENGLAND 
 
The United Kingdom’s Mental Health Act (1959) established 
the Court of Protection.22 Since 1970 it has been assigned the 
responsibility of making statutory wills for incapacitated persons23 
using the substituted-judgment approach. In the case of Re D (J) 
(1982) the court established five principles that were to be followed 
when drafting a statutory will:24 
1. Patients should be assumed to have a brief lucid 
interval at the time the will was made; 
2. During this lucid interval it should be assumed that the 
patient has full knowledge of the past and realizes that 
once the will is executed he or she will lapse back into 
a pre-existing mental state; 
                                                            
18 Ex parte Whitbread in re Hinde, a Lunatic, (1816) 35 Eng Rep 878 (Ch) [Re Hinde]. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Royal College of Psychiatrists, Seminars in Old Age Psychiatry, (London: Gaskell, 
1998) at 301. 
23 Roger Kerridge, Parry & Clark: The Law of Succession, 11thed (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell 2002) at 66.  
24 Re D (J), [1982] 1 Ch 237. 
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3. The patient must be considered, with all his or her 
antipathies and affections that he or she had while in 
full capacity, and not a hypothetical patient.  
4. The patient must be assumed to be acting reasonably 
and to have been advised by a competent solicitor; and 
5. In normal cases, he or she is to be envisaged as taking a 
broad brush to the claims on his or her bounty as 
opposed to an accountant’s pen.25 
It is often the case that an incapacitated person’s preferences 
are unknown, thereby rendering the substituted-judgment approach 
inapplicable. In Re C (1991), the patient was mentally handicapped, 
institutionalized from birth, and upon the death of her parents 
inherited a significant amount of wealth.26 When drafting the 
statutory will, the court recognized that a subjective assessment would 
be untenable because the “record of the patient’s preferences and 
personality are a blank on which nothing has been written.”27 The 
court held that in these circumstances, an objective assessment 
reflecting a “normal decent person, acting in accordance with 
contemporary standards of morality” would be more practical. 28 The 
court believed that there was a moral obligation to recognize both the 
community and the patient’s relatives. As a result, the estate was 
equally divided between local mental health charities and the 
testator’s relatives.    
Implemented in 2005, the Mental Capacity Act has since 
dramatically impacted the way statutory wills are drafted in the 
United Kingdom. Courts are now required to administer an estate 
based upon the “best interests” of the incapacitated person.29 A host of 
considerations are taken into account to make this determination, 
including the individual’s preferences, the views of certain parties 
(such as a caretaker) and relevant circumstances defined in the 
legislation.30 In Re P, Lewison J noted that while the courts could 
explore each of these considerations, they were not obligated to give 
                                                            
25 Ibid.  
26 Re C, [1991] 3 ALL ER 866 (Ch). 
27 Ibid at 870. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Mental Capacity Act 2005 (UK), 2005, c 9, s 4 [MCA]. 
30 MCA, ibid, ss 4(6-7), (11).  
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effect to each of them.31 On this matter, Lewison J stated: 
Counsel stressed the principle of adult autonomy; and said 
P’s best interests would be served by giving effect to his 
wishes. That is, I think, part of the overall picture[,] … But 
what will live on after P’s death is his memory; and for many 
people it is in their best interests that they be remembered 
with affection by their family and as having done “the right 
thing” by their will. In my judgment, the decision-maker is 
entitled to take into account, in assessing what is in P's best 
interests, how he will be remembered after his death.32 
Accordingly, an incapacitated person’s estate may be divided 
in a manner that might not reflect his or her preferences but rather in 
a manner that is reflective of judicial considerations regarding their 
best interests. While the development of this “best interests” standard 
has rendered the substituted-judgment approach less applicable today, 
it continues to be applied in several common law jurisdictions. 
 
B. AUSTRALIA 
Most jurisdictions in Australia allow the courts to execute 
statutory wills on behalf of those lacking testamentary capacity.33 
Each of these jurisdictions employs a regime whereby the courts 
attempt to draft a will that resembles what the incapacitated person 
“might,” “is likely to,” “could,” or “would” have made – in effect the 
substituted-judgment approach.34 While there are subtle differences 
between each jurisdiction, they all seek to provide courts with 
flexibility in the provision of statutory wills. 
South Australia employs a more stringent method known as 
the “likely intentions” standard.35 While the wording seems similar to 
that used in other Australian jurisdictions, it has been interpreted far 
more narrowly and entails a higher threshold of certainty, as seen in 
                                                            
31 Re P, [2009] EWHC 163 at para 41 (Ch). 
32 Ibid at 44. 
33 This includes New South Wales, Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, 
Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia. Martin Terrell, “Wills for persons without 
capacity” (2004) 154 New LJ 968 at 970.  
34 Supra note 16 at 680.  
35 Wills Act 1936, s 7(3)(b) [South Australia Act].  
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Boulton v Sanders (2004).36 In this case, the claimant, Ms. Boulton, 
was appointed as the executor of Amy Sanders’ estate, who was 90 
years old and suffered from dementia. While Ms. Sanders’ had an 
existing will, the principal beneficiary had passed away. Accordingly, 
the estate was to be divided in accordance with the laws of intestacy 
and Ms. Boulton, a longstanding family friend and executor of the 
estate, would receive nothing.  As a result, she applied for a court-
imposed statutory will. The court held that an “accurate reflection of 
likely intentions required a substantial degree of precision” and “if the 
proposed will no more probably reflects likely intentions than a 
number of other possible dispositions,” it would not be authorized.37 
Despite the apparent legitimacy of Ms. Boulton’s claim, the court 
denied it and held that the evidence did not meet the threshold for 
“likely intentions.” 
In cases where an incapacitated person’s preferences are 
unknown, Australian courts have employed an objective approach. In 
Hoffman v Waters (2007), an application for a statutory will was 
sought on behalf of a young person who had lacked capacity since the 
age of three.38 Relying on the aforementioned Re C, the Supreme 
Court of South Australia decided to draft the will so that it would be 
akin to that “of a kind that one would reasonably expect would be 
made by a young man” in his situation.39  
 
C. NEW ZEALAND 
The Family Court of New Zealand has the authority to make a 
property order,40 which entails the appointment of an individual 
(“manager”) to take care of another person’s property.41 The court will 
make such an order if it believes that the individual in question lacks 
the capacity to appreciate the consequences of his or her property-
related decisions or if the individual has the capacity to understand 
the effect of his or her decisions, but is unable to communicate 
                                                            
36 Boulton v Sanders (2004) 9 VR 495 (CA). 
37 Ibid at 515-16. 
38 Hoffman v Waters (2007), 98 SASR 500. 
39 Ibid at 508. 
40 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act1988, NZ 1988, no 4 s 1-15 [Rights 
Protection Act]. 
41 Rights Protection Act, ibid, s 31. 
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them.42 If an individual is subject to a property order, he or she will 
not automatically be considered incapable of making a will.43 The 
court will examine the issue of capacity separately. If it is found upon 
examination that the individual does not possess testamentary 
capacity, the court will be empowered to pass a statutory will.   
New Zealand legislation does not specify whether the court 
should use a subjective or objective assessment when devising a 
statutory will. New Zealand’s common law suggests that the 
subjective substituted-judgment approach is considered the most 
appropriate.44 The courts thus seek to consider and apply the 
individual’s intentions and desires in accordance with the five 
principles established in Re D (J).45 
 
D. NEW BRUNSWICK 
In 1994, the provincial legislature of New Brunswick amended 
the existing Infirm Persons Act,46 providing the Court of Queen’s 
Bench the authority to make, amend or revoke a will on behalf of a 
mentally incompetent individual.47 In doing so, New Brunswick 
became the first and only Canadian province to allow its judiciary to 
execute statutory wills.  
The Act states that the courts of New Brunswick may draft a 
statutory will “where [it] believes that, if it does not exercise [its] 
power, a result will occur on the death of the mentally incompetent 
person that the mentally incompetent person, if competent…would 
not have wanted.”48 The court is thus required to employ the 
substituted-judgment approach when possible, similar to its 
counterparts in New Zealand and parts of Australia. In making 
subjective assessments, the Court of Queen’s Bench has relied on 
principles established in English case law, including Re D (J),49 and 
                                                            
42 Rights Protection Act, ibid, s 6(1). 
43 Rights Protection Act, ibid, ss 2, 54, 55. 
44 Re Manzoni (A Protected Person): Kirwan v Public Trustee, [1995] 2 NZLR 498 at 
505 (HC). 
45 Ibid.  
46 Infirm Persons Act, RSNB 1973, c I-8 [IPA]. 
47 IPA, ibid, s 3(4).  
48 IPA, ibid, s 11.1(1).  
49 Re M (Committee of) (1998), 27 ETR (2d) 68 at 77 (NB QB). 
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determines personal interests through the individual’s social 
interactions.50 A subjective assessment is also applied when an 
individual has been incapacitated throughout their entire life.  
Before granting leave for a statutory will, the court must be 
satisfied that the person in question is mentally incompetent. 
However, in addition to an individual being declared mentally 
incompetent, the court may also create, change or revoke a will on 
behalf of anyone found to be incapable of handling his or her affairs 
“through mental or physical infirmity arising from disease, age or 
other cause, or by reason of habitual drunkenness or the use of 
drugs.”51 In this regard, New Brunswick differs from the United 
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, as each requires a finding of 
testamentary incapacity before proceeding with a statutory will 
application. 
 
V 
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR 
 
A. INTESTACY MAY CAUSE UNDESIRABLE OR UNJUST CONSEQUENCES 
An incapacitated person may have once possessed 
testamentary capacity, but during that period may not have made a 
will; others may have lacked capacity since birth or childhood. 
Individuals in both groups will die intestate. In Ontario, the laws of 
intestacy would govern the division of their estate.52 In certain 
circumstances this may produce an objectionable outcome, as 
demonstrated by the two examples below. 
First, assume that a newly married couple has a child named 
Bob. Bob is particularly adored and loved by his elderly grandfather, 
who lives in a retirement home. Unfortunately, Bob’s parents do not 
share these feelings of affection and he becomes a victim of physical 
abuse which leaves Bob severely disabled. Upon learning of this abuse, 
social services place Bob in foster care, where he receives significant 
                                                            
50 Eric L Teed, Q.C. and Nicole Cohoon, “New Wills for Incompetents” (1996), 16 ETJ 
1 at 2. 
51 Ibid at 79. 
52 SLRA, supra note 1, ss 44-49.  
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attention and assistance from the staff. Shortly thereafter, Bob’s 
grandfather passes away and in his will bequests his entire estate to 
Bob. At age 19, Bob’s mental condition worsens and he dies before his 
parents, leaving no dependents. In Ontario, due to the absence of a 
statutory will-making scheme, Bob would die intestate. Due to the 
fact that he did not have a spouse nor any issue, Bob’s parents would 
equally benefit from his estate. Such a result would be repugnant, 
unconscionable and almost certainly contradict what Bob would have 
done had he possessed capacity. This demonstrates the limitations of 
the existing law and, more importantly, demonstrates how the 
administration of justice could be brought into disrepute.  
In the hypothetical situation provided above, an undesirable 
outcome could have been avoided through a scheme allowing for 
statutory wills. Since Bob lost capacity at a young age, his intentions 
and inclinations would not be known. Therefore, when drafting a 
statutory will, a court could employ an objective approach and 
determine how a reasonable person in Bob’s situation would dispose 
of his or her estate by examining the facts and circumstances of the 
case. By utilizing this approach, it is more likely that Bob’s estate 
would be devised in a manner consistent with his presumed 
intentions. 
Second, by allowing an incapacitated person’s estate to be 
divided in accordance with the existing laws of intestacy, individuals 
and organizations can often be wrongfully overlooked. An individual 
lacking capacity, for instance, may have blood relatives with whom he 
or she has no meaningful or even a neglectful and abusive 
relationship. As a result, this individual’s only form of support may 
come from a non-family caretaker, such as a volunteer or employee at 
a mental health care facility. This can be problematic because the 
caretaker would not have a claim on intestacy.53 Furthermore, it is 
uncertain whether the caretaker would have a claim under 
dependents relief legislation. In Perilli v Foley Estate, the Ontario 
Superior Court held that non-dependents could inherit a share of the 
estate based on their moral and legal claims.54 While this decision 
seemed progressive, it has not had much influence or impact in 
remedying the problem at hand. In contrast, a statutory will-making 
                                                            
53 SLRA, supra note 1, ss 44-49. 
54 Perilli v Foley Estate, [2006] 23 ETR (3d) 245. 
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scheme would definitively allow courts to recognize the care and 
service provided by a non-dependent, thereby removing any 
uncertainty and potential injustice from ensuing.   
 
B. STATUTORY WILLS CAN CORRECT OUTDATED WILLS 
Competent persons may lose testamentary capacity and 
circumstances may change in such a way that results in a will no 
longer reflecting the wishes of the testator. Consider the following: 
John and Jane are married and have two children. In her will, Jane 
leaves her entire estate to John and the remainder to their children. A 
decade into the marriage Jane learns that John has been having an 
affair and is devastated. She proceeds to file for divorce and orders a 
restraining order against John. Unable to cope with the circumstances, 
Jane shortly thereafter commits suicide without updating her will. In 
Ontario, the law would likely apply in an inflexible and mechanical 
manner. Despite all the evidence indicating that Jane would not have 
wanted her estate to pass on to John for life, this would be the 
probable result. Such an outcome illustrates a gap within the law that 
allows for counter-intuitive and perverse outcomes. Accordingly, 
empowering courts to pass statutory wills would effectively address 
these problems by allowing the law to operate in a more predictable 
and logical manner, both of which are important characteristics to a 
fair and just legal system.  
 
C. STATUTORY WILLS PROVIDE EQUAL FOOTING & TESTAMENTARY 
FREEDOM 
 
A statutory will-making scheme would advance the rights of 
those who do not possess testamentary capacity. Currently, an 
Ontarian who lacks capacity is deprived of the opportunity to 
determine how his or her estate will be divided. Statutory wills would 
allow these people to be placed “on a more equal footing in terms of 
will-making.”55 As seen in jurisdictions that allow for statutory wills, 
courts will tailor its analysis and decision to the individual in 
                                                            
55 Robert D Nicholson, “Waving the Magic Wand: Solving Key Legal Issues Relating 
to Intellectual Disability”, (1995) 2 Journal of Law and Medicine 270 at 285. 
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question. All relevant information known about the incapacitated 
testator is considered and the estate is divided in a manner that is 
aimed to be more reflective of the testator’s intent. Through this 
process, those who were close to and who provided assistance to the 
incapacitated person would typically be rewarded as beneficiaries of 
the estate while potential beneficiaries who were neglectful or 
abusive may receive far less than expected. 
 
VI 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
 
A. STATUTORY WILLS ARE PATERNALISTIC 
 
Neville Crago, Eric Teed and Nichole Cohoon affirm that 
statutory wills are paternalistic.56 The latter two note that statutory 
wills provide the judiciary with too much discretion, freedom, and 
power.57 Accordingly, the courts are able to interfere with a person’s 
estate and determine how it should be divided.58 Since the individual 
is incapacitated, the distribution takes place without their 
knowledge.59 According to Teed and Cohoon, this represents “another 
example of the Big Brother syndrome” that should be prohibited 
rather than promoted.60 
It is important, however, to distinguish between statutory 
wills that employ a substituted-judgment approach versus a best-
interests standard. The argument put forward by these scholars holds 
little force in the context of statutory wills that apply the subjective 
substituted-judgment approach, where the wills are designed to 
reflect the intentions of the incapacitated person. When drafting these 
wills, the court does not attempt to impose any beliefs or values 
regarding how the estate should be divided, but rather attempts to 
provide autonomy to the individual. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
                                                            
56 Neville Crago, “Reform of the Law of Wills”, (1995) 25 Western Australian Law 
Review 255 at 258.  
57 Supra note 50 at 3.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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conclude that statutory wills that apply a substituted-judgment 
approach are not paternalistic but rather are respectful of the 
individual’s autonomy. 
Some jurisdictions that employ the substituted-judgment 
approach allow for objective assessments (i.e. that of the reasonable 
person) when the interests and inclinations of an individual lacking 
capacity are indeterminable. Such objective assessments are used 
infrequently and are typically applied when an obvious injustice 
would result in the absence of a statutory will. Since the objective 
approach is seldomly used and only in urgent situations, it tempers 
any paternalism-related concerns. On the other hand, the same does 
not hold true for the best-interests standard, as used in the United 
Kingdom. The court’s authority seemingly prevails over the 
individual’s autonomy. Thus, the concerns regarding paternalism may 
be justified.   
 
B. THE LAW IN ONTARIO IS SUFFICIENT 
 
It may be argued that developments in the common law have 
provided Canadian courts with sufficient authority to prevent and 
resolve any injustices that may arise in the administration of an 
incapacitated person’s estate. Thus, the argument holds a statutory 
will-making scheme is simply unnecessary. 
To determine the strength of this argument, it is necessary to 
examine relevant common law developments. In Cleaver et al v 
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association (1892)61 the English court held 
that the law prohibits a criminal from benefiting from his or her 
wrongdoing.62 This rule was adopted in Canada and bears relevance to 
the issue at hand because it can be used to extinguish the rights of a 
beneficiary without relying on a statutory will.63 This can be 
illustrated through the South Australian case, De Gois v Korp.64 In this 
case, Mr. Korp was charged with the attempted murder of his wife. 
                                                            
61 Cleaver et al v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, [1892] 1 QB 147 (CA). 
62 Ibid at 156-57. 
63 Norman M Tarnow, “Unworthy heirs: The Application of the Public Policy Rule in 
the Administration of Estates” in Robert C Dick, ed, Estates and Trusts Quarterly 377 
at 377-83.  
64 De Gois v Korp, [2004] 1 VSC 450. 
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While he was not successful, his wife was severely injured and 
eventually lost testamentary capacity. In her will, she had left 
everything to Mr. Korp. The South Australian court exercised its 
statutory will-making authority and removed Mr. Korp as a 
beneficiary. In Canada, however, a statutory will would not be 
necessary. Since Mr. Korp would profit from his criminal act, the rule 
of public policy would be invoked and as a result, he would be 
removed as a beneficiary of the estate. 
The second development took place in Cummings v 
Cummings.65 In this decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal examined 
how a dependent’s relief claim should be assessed and quantified. The 
Court held that the legal and moral obligations between the deceased 
and the dependent must be considered before determining whether 
adequate support was provided.66 Prior to the Cummings decision, 
moral obligations were not considered in a dependent’s relief claim. 
However, with the inclusion of moral considerations a person’s estate 
can be devised in a more equitable manner. This process can help 
protect dependents of an incapacitated individual from suffering grave 
injustices. 
The common law developments prevent the occurrence of 
certain injustices. However, they are far too limited in their scope to 
effectively substitute for a statutory will-making scheme. The general 
rule of public policy only allows the removal of a beneficiary if he or 
she has profited from a criminal act (i.e. murdering a testator). 
However, if a non-dependent beneficiary indirectly caused a person 
to lose capacity (i.e. by putting them through unbearable emotional 
pain) or if they acted cruelly towards the incapacitated person but 
remained within the bounds of the law, the rule would not apply. The 
beneficiary would therefore inherit at least a portion of the estate, 
even if it were clear that the incapacitated person would have opposed 
such an outcome. While the decision in Cummings provided the 
courts with greater authority, it was confined to dependent relief 
claims and would not be able to resolve these predicaments. 
 
 
                                                            
65 Cummings v Cummings, (2004) 69 OR (3d) 397 (Ont CA) [Cummings]. 
66 Ibid at para 50. 
   
82 
C. A Scheme Facilitating Statutory Wills is Philosophically 
Irreconcilable 
 
Crago claims that the concept of a statutory will is foreign “to 
the philosophy that has always informed wills legislation in Anglo-
Australian law. The courts have always emphatically disclaimed any 
jurisdiction to make a will or any part of a will for a testator.”67 While 
one could contend that Cargo’s argument applies to Ontario, existing 
Ontario legislation does not seem to support such a claim. For 
instance, following the Cummings decision, the judiciary has been 
provided with greater freedom and authority to restructure the 
distribution of an estate for the purposes of adequately providing for a 
dependent beneficiary.68 Nevertheless, even if Cargo’s argument is 
accepted, it should not be afforded much weight. An individual who 
is born without capacity does not choose to die intestate. Likewise, a 
person who possessed capacity but loses it later on in life would not 
choose to leave his orher will outdated. These individuals are robbed 
of this choice because they lack testamentary capacity. The 
availability of a statutory will restores their choice and helps prevent 
unjust results. Therefore, the clear need and obvious benefits that 
result from instituting a statutory will-making scheme outweigh the 
claim that the scheme is a foreign concept. 
 
VII 
PROPOSAL 
 
Ontario courts should be given the power to impose a 
statutory will on behalf of an individual who lacks testamentary 
capacity.  While many of the specific and technical details of such a 
scheme are difficult to conclude concretely, there are several key 
elements that should be recognized as acceptable. Firstly, it seems 
appropriate to employ a substituted-judgment approach. In applying 
the approach the court attempts to make a decision akin to that of the 
incapacitated person, assuming he or she possessed capacity. This 
approach is preferred over the best interests standard use in England, 
                                                            
67 Supra note 56 at 260. 
68 Cummings, supra note 65.  
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since it does not give the court the authority to prioritize its own 
views above that of the incapacitated person and thus avoids charges 
of being overtly paternalistic.  
Secondly, in certain circumstances, an incapacitated person’s 
preferences will be unknown. In such situations an objective approach 
should be applied (i.e. what a “reasonable” person would do in the 
given situation). An objective approach is more preferable than 
attempting to determine an incapacitated person’s intentions or 
inclinations, as they may not be consistent. 
Lastly, the language that is to be used in the substituted-
judgment approach should be carefully selected. The courts should 
not attempt to make a decision akin to the “likely intentions” of the 
incapacitated person. Based upon the case law in Australia, the term 
“likely intentions” is interpreted in a strict manner and imposes an 
overly high threshold. As a result, it can prevent a statutory will from 
being applied in a number of urgent situations, thereby defeating its 
purpose. A more flexible formulation would be appropriate, and 
should strive to determine what a normal person “would” choose to 
do if he or she were not incapacitated. 
 
 
